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BOOK REVIEWS
OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION.

By Ann Braden Johnson.
259. $22.95.

New York: Basic Books.

Pp. xxvi,

Reviewed by Michael L. Perlin*
I. INTRODUCTION

Jan Costello, a law professor, tells a story about what she
experiences whenever she attends a cocktail party and the other guests
find out that, before becoming an academic, she worked as a civil rights
lawyer representing institutionalized mentally ill individuals:
Weren't you one of those people who got everybody out
of the mental hospital? This is all your fault!'
She is not alone. I have heard the same charge' - generally
leveled with tones of anger, derision and disbelief - so many times that
I have begun to routinely turn down social invitations to get-togethers that
I can anticipate will take this conversational turn. The promise of cruditds
and Perrier simply isn't worth it.
I begin this review with this personal confession of antisocial
behavior because I think Jan's experiences - and mine, and those of at
least a dozen other friends of mine who devoted portions of their careers
as litigators to the representation of this most underrepresented and
overmaligned subset of "Carolene Products Footnote 4"' 3 clients

-

reflect

* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University, J.D.,
Columbia University Law School. I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Joel
Dvoskin.
1.
J. Costello, Autonomy and the Homeless Mentally Ill.
Rethinking Civil
Commitment in the Aftermath of Deinstitutionalization(paper presented at the Association
of American Law Schools' Section on Law & Psychiatry, annual conference in San
Francisco, CA, Jan. 7, 1990).
2.
Before becoming a law professor, I spent eight years as Director of the New
Jersey Department of the Public Advocate's Division of Mental Health Advocacy.
3. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938),
the Supreme Court approved of a more searching constitutional inquiry in cases
involving "discrete and insular minorities" traditionally shielded from the political
processes. See also, Perlin, Institutionalizationand the Law, in PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES

557

558

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VIII

one of the most troubling (I hesitate to say "maddening") aspects of the
discourse that has arisen over the fate of America's homeless individuals:
who are they, why did they get that way, what (if anything) can the rest
of us do about it, and, most pointedly, who is to blame?
On the latter question, our "ordinary common sense"' is quite
clear: the villain responsible for homelessness is deinstitutionalization. 5
The selection of this particular bogeyman is consistent whether the

observer is the lurid New York Post, the sober New York Times, the
flamboyant former NYC Mayor Ed Koch, or scholarly psychiatrists such

as E. Fuller Torrey or H. Richard Lamb."

Deinstitutionalization is

vilified, variously, as an inherently-flawed social experiment, an
operationally-flawed political disaster, or a morally-flawed example of
cynical opportunism. 7 No matter what the diagnosis, though, the cause

of blame is virtually universal: blame it on the patients' lawyers.'
IN INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 75, 77 (Amer. Hosp. Ass'n, ed. 1978) (mental patients are
"the voiceless, those persons traditionally isolated from the mainstream of the
majoritarian, democratic political system").
4. See Sherwin, Dialectsand Dominance:A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law
of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737-38 (1988) ("ordinary common sense" is
a prereflective attitude exemplified by the attitude of "[wihat I know is 'self-evident'; it
is what everybody knows"). I discuss the role of "ordinary common sense" (OCS) in
the homelessness context in Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization and
Homelessness:A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUSTON L. REV. 63, 88-89 (1991).
5. A New York Times national poll conducted just two years ago found that 82%
of respondents believed homelessness to be the fault of "mental institutions for releasing
patients who aren't able to lead normal lives." N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, Sec. E, at
5, Col. 1.
6. See e.g., Cuomo's Curious View of History, N.Y. Post, Nov. 27, 1989, at 18,
col. 1 (editorial); To Restore New York City: First, Reclaim the Streets; Billions for the
Homeless: Snatched, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1991, Sec. 1, at 28 (editorial); Koch, Lunacies
of Government: Legal, Bureaucratic, Ideological, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1988, at 1, Col.
1; Lamb, Deinstitutionalizationand the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35 Hosp'. & COMMUN.
PSYCHIAT. 899, 902 (1984); E.F. TORREY, NOWHERE To Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY
OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 156-59 (1988).
7.
See Perlin, supra note 4, at 86-97 (discussing critiques).
8. See e.g., Lamb, supra note 6, at 902; Engel, D. C. 's Homeless Schizophrenics
Get Little Help, Report Finds, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1985, at Cl, Col. 2 (quoting
Torrey). Former Mayor Koch has characterized libertarian patients' rights lawyers as
"crazies." Lambert, Psychologists Back Koch's Policy on Hospitalizing Homeless
People, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1987, at Al, col. 2. These arguments are spelled out in
greatest length in R. ISAAC & V. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 107-60 (1990).
I respond to Lamb on this and other related issues in D. Mossman & M.
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The. story goes something like this:' nurtured by radical
psychiatrists (such as Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing), spurred on by
politically-activist organizations pushing egalitarian social agendas (such
as the ACLU), a cadre of brilliant but diabolical patients' rights lawyers
dazzled sympathetic and out-of-touch judges with their legal legerdemain9
abetted by wooly-headed social theories, inapposite constitutional
arguments, some oh-my-god worst-case anecdotes about institutional
conditions,"0 and a smattering of "heartwarming successful
[deinstitutionalization] cases"" - as a result of which courts entered
orders "emptying out the mental institutions" '12 so that patients could "die
-

Perlin, Psychiatry and the Homeless Mentally Ill.- A Reply to Dr. Lamb (unpublished
manuscript).
9. See e.g., E.F. TORREY, supra note 6, at 156-59 (influence of Freud and Szasz);
Lamb, Involuntary Treatment for the Homeless Mentally Ill,
4 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 269, 276 (1989) (influence of Szasz and R.D. Laing); Haber, The
Freedom To Be Psychotic, 2 J. L. & HEALTH 157, 165 n. 51 (1987-88) (legal barriers
to care erected primarily by the American Civil Liberties Union).
10.
In reality, early institutional conditions cases regularly involved shocking
disclosures of patient brutality, mistreatment and abuse. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,755-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1973);
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305, 1311 n. 6 (5 Cir. 1974):
One [Alabama state hospital patient] . . .died
after a garden hose had been inserted into his
rectum for five minutes by a working patient
who was cleaning him; one died when a fellow
patient hosed him with scalding water; another
died when soapy water was forced into his
mouth; and a fourth died from a selfadministered overdose of drugs which had been
inadequately secured.
The chairman of the legal action committee of the National Association of Retarded
Children characterized the Pennhurst facility in suburban Philadelphia - the subject of
litigation in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), and Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), 465 U.S. 89 (1984) - as "a Dachau, without ovens."
L. LIPPMANN & I. GOLDBERG, THE RIGHTS TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 17 (1973).

11. Etzioni, Deiistitutionalization:A.Vastly Oversold Good Idea, COLUMBIA, Vol.
3, No. 4 (Spring 1978), at 14, 17.
12. The ultimate, causal empirical impact of O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 575-76 (1975), in which the Supreme Court found a right to liberty for
nondangerous mentally ill individuals who could survive safely in freedom, remains
unclear. See 1 M.L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §2.12,
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with their rights on. " 3 When cynical bureaucrats read the judicial
handwriting on the hospital walls, they then joined the stampede, and the
hospitals were thus emptied.
Ergo deinstitutionalization.
Ergo
homelessness. Endgame.
The trouble with this story, of course, is that it's all wrong. Dead
wrong. Obscenely wrong. None of this happened this way 4 as even the
most superficial review of social history (not to mention legal analysis)
should tell us. And yet, we stick to this story because of its convenience,
and the way it lets us blame one of our favorite sets of fall guys (fall
persons?) for social ills: the civil libertarian lawyers.' 5 The popular
explanation may be neat, simple and self-contained, but, like most such
explanatory packages, it completely misses the point. 6 Our social
discourse on this most complicated and difficult question is, simply, built
at 109-10 (1989); Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding
Individual ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 142-44 (1984).
13.
Treffert, Dying With Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041 (1973).
14.
In reality, patients' rights litigation has been praised for "significantly
improv[ing] the quality of life" for institutionalized persons, bringing an end to "[t]he
filth, squalor, and unsafe conditions" that had characterized state institutional life. See
Ricci v. Callahan, 646 F. Supp. 378, 379 (D. Mass. 1986). Most of the important "first
wave" of patients' rights litigation sought the declaration of a right to treatment. See
generally, 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 12, Chapter 4 (discussing cases). While some
well-known patients' lawyers have explicitly stated that their goal has been the "abolition
of involuntary hospitalization," see B.J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL
PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LAW 232 (1972), other lawyers involved in early
test cases focused on the need to fund adequate care and services, see e.g., Wald &
Friedman, The Politics of Mental Health Advocacy in the United States, 1 INT'L J. L.
& PSYCHIATRY 137, 142-48 (1978); Rhoden,
The Limits of Liberty:
Deinstitutionalization,Homelessness, and LibertarianTheory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 40708 (1982). It also strains the bounds of credulity to attribute the views of one patients'
lawyer - albeit one as influential as Ennis - to all of the lawyers representing patients
and ex-patients.
15.
The converse is actually true.
The provision of legal services to
institutionalized mentally disabled persons is usually shamefully and embarrassingly
poor, and has been always been seen as "grossly inadequate" by commentators See
generally, Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the
Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (Summer 1982); 2 M.L.
PERLIN, supra note 12, Chapter 8; Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of
the Role of Counsel in the Trial of Mental Disability Cases, - Law & Human Behav.
(1991) (in press).
16.
See D. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY; JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW
6 (1988) ("As H.L. Mencken once said, for every complex problem in our society, there
is a solution that is simple, plausible - and wrong.")
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on several series of myths, all of which need to be "unpacked" 17 if we
are to bring any measure of coherence to the subject at hand.
The story of homelessness is a complex one; its relationship to
deinstitutionalization even more complex. Both phenomena must be
viewed in social and political contexts that critically consider a
staggeringly-complicated and intertwined set of issues, ranging from the
ways that state hospital bureaucracies really work to the different funding
mechanisms that control how therapeutic care is provided in different
locations (and in facilities run by different governmental units), from the
role of psychotropic drugs in the treatment of the seriously mentally ill to
the recognition of the universality of irreversible neurological side effects
in the populations that have been given these drugs over extended periods
of time, 8 and, most importantly, from our morally bankrupt social
welfare policies that govern the way that poor people can try to obtain all
of life's essentials (housing, entitlements, jobs, general health care) to the
callous and mocking cruelty of the Reagan years.19 The blame-thepatients'-lawyers school of thought deftly and cleverly ignores all of these
complicated issues.
All of this may be why I was so overwhelmed when I read Ann
Braden Johnson's Out of Bedlam: The Truth About
Deinstitutionalization,'o the finest piece of extended and thoughtful
writing that has yet been done on the deinstitutionalization/homelessness
work is a penetrating, thoughtful,
Dr. Johnson's'
issue. 2
I attempt to do this in the insanity defense context in Perlin, Unpacking the
17.
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE WEST.
RES. L. REV. 599 (1989-90).
18. Researchers are beginning to question whether short-term drugging can also
use similar, irreversible side-effects. See Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Center,
196 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 244-46 (Ct. App. 1987), appealdismissed
as improvidently granted, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P. 2d 698 (1988).
19.
I attempt to contextualize each of these issues in Perlin, supra note 4. See
generally, 2 M. PERLIN, supra note 12, §§7.23-7.27.
ABOUT
TRUTH
THE
OF
BEDLAM:
OUT
A.B. JOHNSON,
20.
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (1990).

21.

Rossi,

For a superb historical and sociological overview of homelessness, see P.H.
DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS (1989). For an

excellent empirical investigation of the way that the mental health system actually treats
the deinstitutionalized, see D.A. LEWIS, S. RIGER, H. ROSENBERG, ET. AL., WORLDS
OF THE MENTALLY ILL: How DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION WORKS IN THE CITY (1991).

Ann Braden Johnson, Ph.D., is a clinical social worker currently in charge
22.
of providing mental health services for women at the Riker's Island jail in New York
City.
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comprehensive, balanced and powerful essay on the two social
phenomena, the extent of their relationship (and whether there is any
meaningful causality in that relationship), the true villains, the true
victims, and some possible solutions. The book is near perfect,' and
should be required reading for everyone who writes about these questions,
who votes on legislative bills that deal with these questions, and who
provides any kind of treatment, or social or legal services to the
populations in question. It's that good.

II. THE BOOK
Deinstitutionalization was a movement at once cynical
and idealistic, political and utopian, fiscally conservative
and therapeutically daring.
It was a great social
experiment, and we are still trying to figure out if it
worked.'
So begins Dr. Johnson's book. In attempting to explore whether
deinstitutionalization "worked," her investigations lead her to a wide
variety of social, treatment, fiscal and administrative issues, none of
which can be understood by refuge to simple explanations. As she
underscores:
The trouble with simplistic thinking about complicated
issues is that it is so tempting to look at complex
problems as if they were clear and straightforward and
easy to solve that we fool ourselves into believing what
we really know isn't true. But the truth is so much more
horrible that we come to prefer to delude ourselves,
hoping meanwhile that someone will come up with
answers to all the problems that won't go away.'
She starts by doing what too many authors in this area fail to do:
she places deinstitutionalization in its proper historical context2" by
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra text accompanying notes 81-92 for my two minor criticisms.
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at xiv.
Id. at 135.
For earlier historical investigations of the same question, see A. SCULL,

DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT -

A RADICAL VIEW

(1977) [hereinafter DECARCERATION]; A. SCULL, SOCIAL ORDER/MENTAL DISORDER:
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examining the way state hospitals developed,2 and the gradual but
constant deterioration of such facilities (until the president of the
American Psychiatric Association declared them "bankrupt beyond
remedy" in 1958). Johnson points out that at about the same time, the
state governors - fearing fiscal bankruptcy from the spiraling increases
in patient populations" - called for the development of out-patient
clinics' as a means of reducing hospital censuses,3 1 while a federallyfunded study commission recommended the creation of community-based
treatment facilities to end the isolation of isolated state facilities "where
backward, custodial systems still thrive." '32
Eventually, the federal Community Mental Health Center
(CMHC) Act of 1963 provided for grants to build community facilities to
provide mental health services with special focus.on individuals who could
not afford fee-for-service mental health care in the community; however,
the services that the centers were mandated to provide were, from the
outset, Johnson charges, "woefully inadequate for the chronically mentally
ill." 33 On the contrary, CMHCs became a treatment setting of choice
for the so-called "worried well:" "individuals who had interpersonal and
intrapersonal problems [and] were amendable to counseling and
psychotherapy. "' All of this happened, of course, years before there
was any litigation on behalf of the mentally ill; 35 it also happened
(1989).
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 5-23.
Solomon, The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to American
28.
Psychiatry, 115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1958).
The number of mentally ill persons under institutional care increased 188
29.
times in the century from 1840 to 1940 during which time the nation's population
increased only eight fold. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE MENTAL HEALTH

ANOLO-AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

27.

PROGRAMS OF THE FORTY-EIGHT STATES 29 (1950).

30.
31.
32.

Id. at 40-41.
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 27.
Id. at 31 (quoting DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE

ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA, (1980)).

Id. at 37.
33.
E.F. TORREY, supra note 6, at 145.
34.
35. On the rise of mental disability litigation as a specialty, see 1 M.L. PERLIN,
supra note 12, Chapter 1. Although there was a scattering of piecemeal litigation in
cases involving the institutionalized mentally disabled, "mental disability law's" birth can
logically be traced to 1971 and 1972 - the date of the trial court decisions in Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (right to treatment) and Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (application of procedural due process
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entirely independently of the discovery and mass-marketing of the
antipsychotic drugs to which the initial exodus of patients from state
facilities is usually attributed. '
Johnson carefully traces the expanded development of drug
therapy in state hospitals, and the near-euphoria that the availability of

such drugs brought on,37 but contrasts the resulting "romance with the
efficacy of the medications" with the subsequent "near-universal amnesia
about their purpose" (which was, originally, to make patients more
amenable to other forms of treatment):3" the drugs became the sole
treatment available to many state hospital residents, a situation that

remains constant to this day.39
In the first wave of right to refuse treatment litigation, state
hospital directors were candid that the drugs were the "be all and end all"
of public hospital treatment.' We have also since learned that, in many
instances, the drugs bring on a set of profound and irreversible
neurological conditions - perhaps the most common and pernicious of

to involuntary civil commitment hearings), and the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (application of due process to commitments following
incompetency to stand trial determinations).
For the standard theology, causally linking the introduction of the major
36.
tranquilizers with the reduction of state hospital censuses, see e.g., Brill, State Hospitals
Should Be Kept - For How Long? in STATE MENTAL HOSPITALS: PROBLEMS AND
POTENTIALS 151 (J. Talbott, ed. 1980). Compare DECARCERATION, supra note 26, at
79-89 ("highly implausible" to suggest that drugs' efficacy was "primarily responsible"
for early roots of deinstitutionalization); Perlin, supra note 4, at 85 nn. 132-33 (citing
sources). The causal relationship continues to serve as the orthodox explanation. See
Sack, Crossroads in Mental Health: Red Ink and Unused Wards, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
1991, at Al, Col. 1 ("Since the 1950's, when psychiatry was revolutionized by the
introduction of mood-leveling drugs, New York's mental hospitals have been discharging
patients into group homes, outpatient programs, and, disturbingly, into the streets").
37. See e.g., A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 46 (quoting JoINT COMMISSION ON
MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 39 (1961) (Arno repr.

1980)): "Unquestionably, the drugs have delivered the greatest blow for patient freedom,
in terms of nonrestraint, since Pinel struck off the chains of the lunatics in the Paris
asylum 168 years ago."
38.
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 47 (emphasis in original).
39. For a recent opinion decrying the improper use of such drugs as the treatment
of choice for virtually all institutionalized mental patients, see Thomas S. v. Flaherty,
902 F. 2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. den., I11 S. Ct. 373 (1990) (institutional
drugging "substantially departed from acceptable professional standards").
40.
See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D.N.J. 1979).
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which is tardive dyskinesia 4 - that can cause the sort of involuntary
and abnormal movements of the tongue, mouth and limbs that forever
labels the released patient on the street as one who has been a long-term
state hospital resident. As Judge Stanley Brotman observed in the initial
trial in Rennie v. Klein, the same drugs that are so prescribed to lessen the
severity of thought disorders also serve to "inhibit a patient's ability to
learn social skills needed to fully recover from psychosis." 42
None of this history, however, illuminates the core issue here; an
issue that we see starkly every time a suburban zoning panel mobilizes
itself to fight against any sort of halfway house or group facility for the
once-institutionalized. No one wanted chronically mentally ill patients in
their community (the dreaded NIMBY (Not In My BackYard)
syndrome).4' And why should we be surprised to learn that propertyvalue conscious suburbanites - even traditional "liberals" 44 - felt this
way, when we learn from Dr. Johnson that community mental health
centers - facilities established pursuant to federal law in the early 1960's
ostensibly to serve this population4' have exactly the
same
response. 4 A Kentucky psychiatrist wrote that state hospitals would
have to be maintained because "it would not have been good for a [CMH]
center's community image if it were to be seen solely as a place for the
41.
See generally, 2 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 12, §5.02, at 218-27.
42. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1299. See also, Perlin, supra note 4, at 103-04 (side
effects that retard social skill progress may make patients even less employable once they
are deinstitutionalized).
43. See Bach, Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalization:
Toward a Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 1153,
1160 n. 41 (1989) (discussing NIMBY). Relocation of ex-patients in community settings
has been characterized as reflecting "bile barrel politics," the inverse of the politically
and socially-desirable "pork barrel" project. See Marmor & Gill, The Political and
Economic Context of Mental Health Care in the United States, 14 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 459, 467 (1989). The term is explained in Pitney, Bile Barrel Politics:
Siting Unwanted Facilities, 3 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 446, 448 (1984).
44.

See D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 188-89 (1984)

(discussing role of paradigmatically liberal Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman in
attempting to block the opening of group homes in her Congressional district in
Brooklyn); see also, BAM Historic Dist. Ass'n v. Koch, 723 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir.
1983).
45.

A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 37; see generally, E.F. TORREY, supra note

6, at 109-50.
46.

A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 78-80.
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care of former state hospital patients. ' 47 To this day, Johnson tells us,
clinic workers are compelled to "discourage the chronically mentally ill
from continuing" in treatment at CMHCs.
In other words, the patients most in need of follow-up services
those who had been mentally ill and institutionalized for the longest time
- were precisely those who were discouraged from seeking treatment at
-

the centers that were originally conceived of as an alternative to the state
hospitals. It should also come as no surprise that the treatment available

at such centers to the chronically mentally ill was precisely the same drug
treatment that had been administered in the large state hospitals from
which such persons had been discharged. 9

The problems become even more muddled when the byzantine
question of funding sources gets added to the mix. If all commentators
in this area agree on one matter it is this: there is no coherence in the way
that the various governmental units allocate funds to be spent on treatment
of the mentally ill. Johnson shows graphically the level of our folly
here.' She makes one other important point that is all too often lost in
47. Id. at 78, citing Farkas, Afiercare in Community Mental Health Centers, 21
HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIAT. 304-05 (1970).
48.
Id. at 78. Support for this conclusion is wide-spread in the literature. See
e.g., E.F. TORREY, supra note 6, at 142-51; Hiday & Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina
Experience With Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 215, 230-31.(1987); Note, 1988 Amendments to Georgia'sMental health
Statutes: The Latest Attempt to Provide A Solution to the Problem of the Chronically
Mentally Ill, 36 EMORY L.J. 1313, 1344 n. 183 (1987); Schwartz & Costanzo,
Compelling Treatment in the Community.- Distorted Doctrines and Violated Values, 20
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1386-9 (1987).
49.
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 79-80. The "all but universal" use of
medication as the primary treatment modality for serious mentally ill persons in
community settings is sharply criticized in Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs,
Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1727 n. 23 (1984): "Drugs
make custody possible without its traditional physical trappings. To house a drugged
population, the thick walls, physical barriers, geographical isolation and staff supervision
of state mental hospitals are generally unnecessary." Id. at 1750 (footnote omitted). The
deinstitutionalization literature provides us with some other important, but generally
underreported data. Evidence suggests that some deinstitutionalized homeless individuals
remain on the streets to avoid regimens of compulsory drugging in psychiatrichospitals,
Fischer & Breakey, Homelessness and Mental Health: An Overview, 14 INT'L J.
MENTAL HEALTH 6, 29 (1986), but other data shows that the deinstitutionalized will seek
out medical care in generalhospitals, see Silver, Voluntary Admission to New York City
Hospitals:The Rights of the Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 399,
400-01 n. 3, 402-03 n. 5 (1988); see generally, Perlin, supra note 4, at 104-05.
50.
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 93-95.
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this policy debate: Medicaid, "the most important federally sponsored

program affecting deinstitutionalization,"' 1 must shoulder a major portion
of the blame for the failure of the states to develop meaningful
community-based alternatives to state hospitals because it failed to provide
reimbursement for precisely those mental health services that chronically
mentally ill patients need following years of hospitalization - "clinical
services such as day hospitalization, and nonmedical services such as
casework, advocacy, and vocational counseling." 52 On the other hand,
Medicaid made it both convenient and profitable for nursing homes to fill
the institutional void."
The financial coup de grace was added here by the expansion of
the fully federally-funded SSI program,' which for a variety of
administrative and operational reasons made it easier for state mental
health bureaucracies to tout deinstitutionalization as an important cost
savings measure.55 SSI became one of the artificial props that supported
51.

Id. at 94, quoting U.S. General Accounting Office, RETURNING THE

MENTALLY DISABLED To THE COMMUNITY: THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS To Do MORE

81(1977).
52. Id. at 94.
53.
[S]tate officials quickly learned that while
Medicaid would reimburse them for 50 percent
of nursing home expenses, it would pay nothing
toward the care of patients under sixty-five in
mental hospitals. The 50 percent reimbursement
was available for patients over sixty-five in either
location, but in the case of hospitalized elderly,
the money went into the state's general fund, not
back to the mental health system. The federal
government was saying, in effect, that it would
help states support the senile elderly as long as
they were not in state mental hospitals, which
were still the states' sole political and fiscal
responsibility. . . . A state's mental health
department would have had to be stupid not to
climb aboard this particular gravy train.
Id. at 94-95 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
54. The Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, (codified in
42 U.S.C. §405 (1990)) went into effect on January 1, 1974.
55. A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 88. As Dr. Johnson explains, all players in
the system -patient-advocates, therapists, bureaucrats and state fiscal officers - were
able to rally around the SSI program as a "no lose" vehicle. by which patients could be
released from institutions and be assured that there would be funds available to pay for
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patient releases in the early 1970's; when the Reagan Administration in perhaps its single meanest and most cynical "cost savings measure" jettisoned the mentally disabled from the SSI rolls in 1981,56 the moral
collapse of our social welfare system was all too apparent for those who
wished to see. SSI had allowed (encouraged) states to release patients,
since the entitlement program ensured a disability-based, federally-funded
grant to provide for the ex-patients' support in community settings. When
these payments suddenly and dramatically dried up, it should not have
been a real surprise to policymakers, behavioralists (or editorial writers),
that some former patients would now be without homes. Dr. Johnson
explains this process - likening it, accurately in my mind, to a game of
three-card monte57 - patiently and carefully.5
As a result of all of this, we wound up with a non-system in
which many patients were "transinstitutionalized" 59 to nursing homes and
other adult board-and-care facilities (mostly, Johnson stresses, in forprofit, unregulated residences),' ° and the state hospitals - supported by
subsistence-levelcommunity-based housing. Id. at 97. During the 15 month gap between
the legislation's passage and its date of implementation, state hospital populations
declined by 10.8 percent; in 1974, the first full year of SSI availability, state hospitals
saw a nationwide decrease in population by 13.3 percent, the largest one year decrease
in history. Id. at 97-98.
56. See A.B. JOHNSON supra note 20 at 99; see generally, Perlin, supra note 4,
at 78; Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
57. A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 100. Interestingly, in describing the role of
the availability of federal funds in this process, E.F. Torrey uses almost the same exact
metaphor. See E.F. TORREY, supra note 6, at 152 ("mentally ill individuals became
pawns in a huge fiscal shell game").
58.
The best-known means by which
mentally ill people became homeless began in
1981, when the federal government under Ronald
Reagan took advantage of an opportunity to cut
costs in the Social Security program by throwing
as many people off the disability rolls as they
could.
See A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 153.
59. Id. at 119-22.
60.
Id. at 120-28. Recent empirical surveys reveal that, apart from psychiatric
wards of general hospitals and psychiatric hospitals, nursing homes are the medical
settings in which psychotropic drugs are most widely prescribed. De Leo, Stella &
Spagnoli, Prescription of Psychotropic Drugs in Geriatric Institutions, 4 INT'L J.
GERIAT. PSYCHIATRY 11, 14 (1989).
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small-town legislators" and, in some jurisdictions, powerful public
employee unions - continued to receive the biggest percentage of state
mental health budgets, even though the caseloads of such facilities had,
in some cases, dropped precipitously, 62 and had, in others, dramatically
changed in composition.' As a result of all of this, as Johnson notes
somewhat ruefully, "'the hospital' has maintained its position as the
centerpiece of the system, the focal point, the hub around which the rest
of the system revolves. . . . [Nlothing has really changed."'

So much for deinstitutionalization.

What about homelessness?

Again, Johnson traces - expertly, thoughtfully and sensitively - the
factors that have gone to cause the increase in homelessness: spiraling
unemployment rates among those with the lowest skill levels, lack of
affordable housing stock (partially caused by yuppie gentrification and by
tax abatement laws), the death of "single room occupancy" residences
(much maligned, but generally a preferable address for many ex-patients),
an over-all reduction of welfare benefits and entitlements (including, but
not limited to, the SSI debacle), and the stark reality that the poor are
now dramatically poorer than they were thirty years ago.6'
61.
Large public facilities have long been a primary employer in small, remote,
poor communities. A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 128-29. See also, Sack, supra
note 36, at 26, Col. 6 (discussing threatened closure of Gowanda Psychiatric Center in
southwestern New York State); Fortunato, 300 Protest Closing of HandicappedCenter,
The Trentonian, Feb. 22, 1991, at 3 (discussing threatened closure of Johnstone Training
and Rehabilitation Center in Burlington County, New Jersey).
62. See e.g., E.F. TORREY, supra note 6, at 155 (between 1955 and 1981, while
New York's number of state hospital patients decreased from 94,000 to 24,000, state
hospital staff numbers rose from 24,000 to 37,000; between 1969 and 1981, while
patient population in the U.S. decreased by 66%, the total hospital expenditures in
constant dollars decreased only by 3 %).
63.
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 130 (hospitals shifted from long-term
custodial care to providing "brief and rapid interventions in acute exacerbations of a
chronic condition"). Interestingly, at the same time, as state legislatures, concerned that
it was time to "reverse the pendulum," broadened civil commitment statutes that had
been tightened in the wake of early decisions such as Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1049 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (see supra note 34)), the number of involuntarily committed
patients began to re-increase significantly, including many first-time commitments,
resulting once again, in some jurisdictions, in overcrowdingof state facilities. See Perlin,
supra note 4, at 127-29, discussing, inter alia, data reported in Durham & LaFond, A
Search for the Missing Premise of Invohntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective
Treatment of the Mentally Il, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 303, 401 (1988).
64.
A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 131.
65.
Id. at 135-44. See generally, Perlin, supra note 4, at 70-80 (discussing the
"myths of homelessness").
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We also know, as Johnson stresses, that a high percentage of

homeless individuals are single mothers with small children; there are now
more children living in New York City's emergency shelter system than
there are single individuals over the age of 18; families outnumber single
persons by a ratio of over 3 to 2.' Yet, the public wilfully blinds itself
to these social and economic realities, and blames homelessness on

deinstitutionalization 7 (which it can then blame on a handful of "radical
lawyers"). How neat."
The mentally ill are, of course, among the most vivid and

unsettling of the homeless.'

Our causality here, though, is fatally

misplaced. Like other extremely poor individuals, mentally ill persons
without social support systems - without the financial ability to acquire
a stable living environment - may logically be more likely candidates for
homelessness than individuals with supportive family and community

networks. It also should be fairly clear that the reality of being homeless
can make someone mentally ill.' Neither of these realities provides the
causality that deinstitutionalization's foes heuristically impose on the
homelessness debate. As Johnson graphically underlines:

66. Id. at 145 (citing Manhattan Borough President's Task Force on Housing For
Homeless Families, A Shelter Is Not a Home 6 (1987)).
67. The Heritage Foundation, on the Reagan Administration's most favored policy
"think tanks" has stated flatly that "deinstitutionalization . . . is the major cause of
homelessness."
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, STEMMING THE TIDE OF
DISPLACEMENT: HOUSING POLICIES FOR PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS 75 (1986).
68.
We also, of course, attribute moral blame to the homeless themselves, see
Perlin, supra note 4, at 107-08, assuming that they are inherently "bad .... stubborn,
. . . weak, or . . . lack[ing in] will power." J. Costello, supra note 1, at 2-3
(unpublished manuscript).
69. Concrete and vivid information about a specific problem often overwhelms the
abstract data upon which rational choices are made. See Perlin, Psychodynamics and
the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 3, 12-13 (1990). The vividness effect is one of the heuristic reasoning devices that
individuals use in attempting to simplify complex information-processing. tasks; the
application of these devices leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions.
I consider the impact of this thinking on the homelessness debate in Perlin, supra note
4, at 81 n. 113; see generally, Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980-81).
70. See Kaufman, Homnelessness:A Comprehensive Policy Approach, 17 Soc. SCI.
REV. 21, 23 (1984) (data reveals that homelessness results in mental deterioration).
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The picture of the homeless person as a solitary,
deranged individual, dumped unfeelingly by a state
mental hospital on a street corner and told to sink or
swim, never quite leaves the public imagination- even
though the "dumping" took place twenty years ago and
even though we know most of the homeless are singleparent families with small children.7

The problem is exacerbated yet one more time by the great gap
(a chasm, really) between what the homeless mentally ill need and what
they get. Their needs, as Johnson sees them, are fairly concrete: adequate
housing, outreach programs, access to medical services when needed,
instruction in the "skills of living," work training, work, "noncondescending treatment" and long-term access to psychiatric and
psychological services. 2 Self-evidently, they do not receive these
services.7' On the other hand, there are programs that do work, and
Johnson tells us about several well-known ones.74 The blueprint, in
other words, is there for communities and -governmental entities to
imitate. That we choose not to do so appears inexplicable.
According to Johnson, our fantasy of the homeless has two
sources: first, it tidily explains away a messy social problem (with the
implicit solution of reinstitutionalization), and second, it conforms to a
politically conservative view of social problems as small, local events not
in need of massive federal intervention. She adds, ominously, "That both
ideas are irresponsible and false is, of course, irrelevant." 7 5
So: why do we adhere to "irresponsible" and "false" ideas, and
why is our discourse based on such a proliferation of myths? Johnson
offers several interpretations in addition to the ones already discussed.
Our social and governmental policies are still driven by the Protestant
ethic; we draw a sharp line between the "deserving" and the

71.

A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 55.

72.
Id. at 184-91.
73.
See id. 191-96 (discussing conflicts in currently-existing programs, and
blaming poor level of services on internal staff conflicts, funding-driven programming,
and priority-setting resulting in staff concerns and needs "always com[ing] first").
74. A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 196-202 (e.g., Fountain House, The Lodge,
PACT, the "work ward", day hospital programs, and patient-run self-help programs).
75.
Id. at 156.
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"undeserving" poor,'6 and, in our line-drawing, the homeless mentally
ill come out clearly on the "undeserving" side of the ledger."' Also,

historically, we have chosen to "[b]lame the victim" for our social ills:7"
what better victim than the homeless mentally ill, especially when so
many more of them appear to be female, poor and members of racial and
ethnic minorities?'
Here, Johnson casts a
business aspects of the mental
about this analysis. But, for
section, I think this explanation

significant amount of blame on the big
health system,' and I think she is right
reasons that I will explore in the next
only partially illuminates the dilemma.

III. CONCLUSION

My quibbles are, to be sure, fairly minor. First, I think
Johnson's analysis of the interplay between mental illness and criminal
behavior 8' causes her to be too dismissive of the role of responsibility
76.

See Perlin, supra note 4, at 107-08:
The deinstitutionalized homeless represent the
latest group of the "undeserving poor" to feel
public and political wrath. As a result of the
social myths and meta-myths that have evolved
about the mentally ill over centuries, the
deinstitutionalized homeless exacerbate that
wrath, heightening our feelings of "anger and
revulsion" towards them, especially those whom
we feel have "given in to their dependency
needs."

Id. at 107-08 (footnotes omitted).
77. A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 221-22.
78. Id. at 229. See also, Perlin, supra note 4, at 110 ("Our official policies -'harsh in execution' - blame the deinstitutionalized homeless for their plight and thus
legitimate political bias toward this population"), quoting Fischer & Breakey, supra note
48, at 27; see also, Kaufman, 'Crazy" Until Proven Innocent: Civil Commitnent of the
Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 333, 363 (1988); Goldman &

Morrisey, The Alchemy of Mental Health Policy: Homelessness and the Fourth Cycle of
Reform, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 727, 729 (1985).

79.

Perlin, supra note 4, at 79-80.

80.

A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 209-11.

81.

See id. at 158-76. According to Johnson:
mental illness should not be used as an excuse,
a means to escape responsibility for one's
actions, a defense likely to keep one out of jail if
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and trial competency in the criminal justice system. These issues (which
are actually peripheral to the focus of her book) are far more complicated
than the unsuspecting reader might infer from her treatment.'
Second, and more important, as good as Dr. Johnson's book is,
and as persuasive as I found it on its merits, I found myself wishing that

she had sealed its one gap, to have thus perfectly completed her argument.
She neglects to directly confront the most intractable question of all: Why

do we feel the way that we do about these people?83 While she argues
persuasively that we remain in thrall of the mentally ill because we
conflate their behavior with dangerousness (and her references to garish
tabloid headlines prove her point wonderfully)," she still does not do
justice to this final (seemingly unanswerable) question: what is it about the
mentally ill that causes the rest of us to act irrationally, both on a
personal, emotional level, and on a political, systemic level? Why do we
rely (almost exclusively) on flawed cognitive psychology devices85 to
shape our views of this population?
This is an extraordinarily complicated matter. My tentative
answer is that our attitudes are shaped by two social forces: social
classism (the deinstitutionalized homeless being "jobless, penniless,
functionless and supportless"), 6 and sanism (the "irrational thinking,
that's where anyone else caught committing the
same crime would go. It's fair for mentally ill
offenders to go to jail, and for some of them it
may be the best possible place to be.
id. at 175 (emphasis in original).
82.
My criticism is not merely that I disagree with Johnson. I do, see Perlin,
supra note 17; Perlin, supra note 66, but that is not my point. My concern is that the
brevity with which she treats two enormously important philosophical, constitutional and
moral questions - can we hold criminally liable one who may not be responsible for her
acts? can we put on trial someone who may not understand the charges brought against
her nor be able to consult with her lawyer? - may lull the reader into thinking that
these are not particularly important questions. They may not be for the resolution of the
deinstitutionalization/homelessnessdebate, but they remain important to society for many
other instrumental and normative reasons. For a more in-depth discussion of these issues,
see generally, Perlin, supra note 17.
83.
See Perlin, supra note 17, at 602 (asking this question in the context of
insanity defendants).
84.
See A.B. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 159.
85.
See generally, Perlin, supra note 17, at 623-40.
86.
See Lipton & Sabitini, Constructing Support Systems for Homeless Chronic
Patients, in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 153, 155-56, (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984).
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feeling and behavior patterns of response by an individual or by a society
to . . . a mentally ill individual"). 87 As I have, recently written
elsewhere:
To avoid dealing with issues of economic marginality and
racial exclusion, we perpetuate symbolic stereotypes of
mental illness that reify centuries of social myths and
meta-myths and that have traditionally colored and shaped
the ways we treat the mentally ill. We thus focus our
attention upon a group of victims against whom there is
significant social prejudice instead of questioning the
societal problems that are the true sources of
homelessness. In the end, it is precisely these "sanist"
policies that best explain the moral bankruptcy of our
treatment of the homeless mentally ill. 8
These social attitudes - reinforced by political and media
distortions, and encouraged by the decade of greed that exemplified the
Reagan years' - perpetuate our treatment of the homeless mentally ill:
our social myopia, psychological brutality, and political cynicism.' ° We
further perpetuate stereotypes, and thus avoid examining the fundamental
economic and social questions that underlie the tragedy of homelessness
and, specifically, the homeless mentally ill. We allow our discourse to be
founded on myths to avoid the stark realities lurking just below the
surface.
So, the next time you're at a cocktail party and talk turns to the
homeless, don't blame Jan Costello (if you know her). Or me. I've had
it. Blame Ronald Reagan, 9 Better yet, if you voted for Reagan: blame

87.

Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development, in

MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 97, 105-07 (F. Ayd

ed. 1974). I discuss Birnbaum's theories in Perlin, supra note 4, at 91-93.
88.
Id. at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).
89. See Karmel, The Use of Prosecution (Again), 203 N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 20, 1990),
at 3; see generally, Jahiel, The Situation of Homelessness, IN THE HOMELESS IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 99, 114-15 (R.D. Bingham ed. 1987) (discussing role of greed
in attitudes toward the homeless).
90. Perlin, supra note 4, at 65.
91.
See e.g., Hollings, Bush's Real Problem - The Ruins of Reaganisin, Wash
Post., Apr. 30, 1989, at C1, Col. 4 (Reagan Administration "hollow[ed] . . . out the
federal government . . ."); Marmor & Gill, supra note 43, at 474 (Reagan era helped
create socio-ecomonic environment in which "large scale innovation for the socially
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575

yourself. The shame of America' is, when we get down to it, the fault
of all of us. The fact that we fail to acknowledge this reality may be the
biggest shame of all.
disfavored [became] practically unthinkable").
92. See Homeless in America: HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Housing and
Community Development of the House Comninee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1982) (statement of Robert Hayes).

